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In the humanities and social sciences, 
the politics of memory and related culture 
of remembrance increase their signifi-
cance, affecting legislation, historiograp-
hy, and political science. This article aims 
to present key approaches to studying the 
politics of memory and employ them to the 
analysis of the politics of memory on the 
territory of the former German province 
of East Prussia. The author shows 
different research perspectives on the key 
concepts of memory studies. Some resear-
chers identify the notion of the ‘politics of 
memory’ with that of the ‘politics of 
history’, while others distinguish between 
them. The author evaluates the effects of 
using the category of ‘memory sites’.  
Applying the method of historiographical 
analysis, the author examines similarities 
of and differences between approaches to 
the politics of history and the politics of 
memory. The author evaluates the effects 
of using the notions of ‘memory sites’ and 
‘memory conflicts’ in the Baltic Region 
states, and reviews recent works of 
historians and political scientists on the 
changes in the culture of remembrance in 
Russia in general and the Kaliningrad 
region in particular during the Soviet and 
post-Soviet periods. Modern histo-
riography is used as an example to 
demonstrate that ‘memory sites’ and the 
‘politics of history’ are the most relevant 
concepts in the study of the culture of 
remembrance and identity, whereas a 
comparative analysis proves to be 
effective for the identification of the main 
features of the politics of memory on the 
territory of the former East Prussia. 
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The politics of memory, as a sub-
ject, lies somewhere between two 
fields in the humanities: political his-
tory, which studies activities of politi-
cal institutions and their representation 
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in social consciousness, and memory studies, an interdisciplinary effort ded-
icated to researching collective memory. Political history has been success-
fully developing over several centuries, whereas memory studies became a 
fully-fledged research area only in the last quarter of the 20th century, yet 
the borderline between the two fields is easily crossed, as the problems of 
political history are also closely connected to those of political science. 
Studies of collective memory are best represented by the classical works 
of Pierre Nora and Jan and Aleida Assmann et al. [1; 2; 11]. Nora's concept 
of ‘sites of memory' vs. the Assmanns’ concept of communicative memory 
gained wide acceptance. Using the new conceptual framework, scholars have 
been able to theorise different aspects of collective memory since the 1980s. 
‘Memory boom’, or ‘memorial turn’ are the two buzz-phrases used to de-
scribe the rising interest to all things memory (as expressed by experts and 
members of general public alike). 
The basic concepts of memory studies are the ‘politics of commemora-
tion’ and the ‘politics of memory’, which are interpreted differently. For in-
stance, A. Assmann tends to treat the ‘politics of memory’ (understanding it, 
in line with Claus Leggewie’s views, as organisation, management, and po-
litical decision-making shaping ‘memorial structures’) [1, p. 300] and the 
‘politics of commemoration’ as synonyms. N. E. Koposov also equates these 
terms (‘The politics of history — or politics of commemoration — is a rela-
tively new term, although the phenomenon is very old’ [6, 9. 52]) describing 
memorial legislation as an obvious manifestation of such politics. Some au-
thors use this concept denoting a ‘very old phenomenon’ in the context of 
early Middle Ages [24]. 
However, some researchers distinguish between the two terms. In this 
case, the politics of commemoration (German Gedächtnispolitik) is inter-
preted as discursive, performative, and material representations of collective 
identity, strategies of struggle and completion between memories of different 
groups. The politics of memory (German Geschichtspolitik) is pursued by 
the authorities in the framework of a certain political regime, being one of 
the forms of the politics of commemoration. Ethnic, cultural, social, and 
gender groups competing with the ‘hegemon’ develop their own politics of 
commemoration. Thus, the intricate interrelations between different agents 
concerning the interpretation and representation of the past become a suita-
ble object for interdisciplinary research. 
A. I. Miller distinguishes between the politics of commemoration and the 
politics of history. Dating the emergence of the ‘politics of memory’ back to 
Helmut Kohl’s time in office, when the critics of the politician coined the 
term Geschichtspolitik to denote a decidedly political turn in interpreting the 
past, the historian follows the term’s revival and positive revision (poltyka 
historyczna) by the conservative elites in Poland in 2004, as well as in other 
countries of the region [8, p. 7]. Miller defines the politics of memory as ‘po-
litical manipulations of history’ [8, с. 12] interpreted as an instance of keen 
interest to the politics of commemoration from politicians and researchers [8, 
p. 8]. The latter means that these terms are not synonymous. A. I. Miller’s 
logic is further developed by O. Yu. Malinova, who, following Markku 
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Kangaspuro, distinguishes between the politics of memory and political ex-
ploitation of history — a wide category suggesting conscious manipulations 
of history as a tool of political argumentation [7, p. 8—9]. The analysis of 
the past in modern political discourse and the rhetoric of Russian presidents 
gives O. Yu. Malinova the right to speak of political uses of the past as one 
of the ‘central elements of the politics of symbols’ [7, с. 23]. By adding yet 
another notion in to the mix, she avoids the difficult choice between the no-
tions of ‘politics of memory’ and ‘politics of commemoration’. 
Another complication comes from the different naming traditions in the 
major languages of contemporary science (see [39, S. 15—16]). A lack of 
terminological consensus leads to questionable decisions. One of recent pub-
lications has two titles — a German and an English one. The former uses 
Geschichtspolitik, while the latter — Historical memory culture [20]. 
The first scholar to use the term Geschichtspolitik was Christian Meier 
(incidentally, as of the end of 2000s, this had the widest circulation between 
the Vergangenheitspolitik, Erinnerungspolitik, and Gedächtnispolitik [see 
33, p. 70—71]). In the British and American scholarship, the politics of 
memory was conceptualised at the turn of the 1970s. The studies in this field 
gained additional momentum at the end of the Cold War. 
The major research achievement of the 1990—2000s concerned Europe 
after World War II. The classical work Politics of Memory in Postwar Eu-
rope (edited by Richard Ned Lebow et al., 2006 [35]) carries out a compara-
tive analysis and discusses different European cases of using the past for po-
litical purposes. Other European and US researchers followed suit. In 2010, 
certain conclusions were drawn in the collection of papers Geschichtspolitik 
und kollektives Gedächtnis edited by Harald Schmid (2010). Thus, Heide-
marie Uhl and Harald Schmid described different aspects of politics towards 
the past in modern states [33; 40]. The politics of memory is interpreted by 
the German researchers as a factor of significant political influence and an 
instrument of struggle (Geschichtskampf), which can hardly be reduced to 
either narrow-field historiographical discussions or a public debate on urgent 
political and socioeconomic problems. History-centred struggle is becoming 
an increasingly important field of modern politics. Today, researchers ana-
lyse the forms and means of the politics of memory, its functions and out-
comes, actors, and normative contexts (including legal ones — ‘memorial’ 
legislation, etc.). 
Most researchers of the politics of memory emphasise the influence of 
current elites on its implementation. For instance, in France, active interven-
tions of the authorities into the processes of commemoration (perpetuation 
and representation in national cultural memory) date back to François Mit-
terrand’s time in office (1981—1995). His predecessor, Valéry Giscard d'Es-
taing did not intervene in the field of historical expertise. However, since the 
early 1980s, the authorities represented by special committees have been 
regularly organising commemorations of significant events or persons ([19, 
р. 920]. See, for example, Pierre Nora on the ‘era of commemorations’ [11, 
p. 95—96]). The state involved in the process of revising history does not 
only maintain ‘cold’ memory (through celebrating national heroes and na-
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tional victories) but also takes part in solving the problems of ‘hot’ memory, 
usually dubbed ‘contentious issues of history’ here in Russia. In the 1990s 
France officially recognised its responsibility for the deportation of Jews 
during World War II, which created the framework for a new attitude to the 
‘black pages’ of national narrative (slavery, colonial wars, and other phe-
nomenon, including those, in which the French state had no complicity, for 
instance, the Armenian Genocide in Turkey). Despite Jacque Chirac’s 2005 
declaration that the Republic had no official history [19, р. 921], the state 
formulated a ‘memorial economy’ balancing recognition of mistakes with 
glorification of achievements. 
To understand the direction memory studies are now taking, it is im-
portant to address the notion of the ‘site of memory’ (also known as ‘one of 
the most successful concepts in European historiography over the past 
30 years’) [29, S. 129]). Formulated by researchers of Pierre Nora circle, it 
simply denotes everything that is commemorated. The famous three-volume 
edition describes the means to develop a national discourse: symbols, memo-
rials, pedagogical and historiographical strategies, etc. [28]. 
Many criticised the project. Some opponents would say, for instance, 
that the ‘sites of memory’ were clearly connected with national (state) inter-
ests. A single national discourse could provoke conflicts over the ‘sites of 
memory’ and a competition for commemorative strategies. Others would 
claim that the project proposed by Nora and his colleagues was a mere intel-
lectual game, a game possible only within the French cultural tradition and 
irreproducible in other contexts [4, p. 70]. It was time that has proven the 
critics wrong. 
It is not surprising that further studies of the ‘sites of memory’ pursued 
two research avenues — applying the popular concept to other countries and 
studying ‘sites of memory’ at different levels. The first research area has 
produced works on the history of Italian, German [14; 16]) and other nation-
al ‘sites of memory’. According to Benoit Majerus, as of 2013, 12 national 
projects, including studies of the ‘geography of memory’ were completed in 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Russia, and 
Switzerland alongside the countries mentioned already [29, p. 121]. 
The second approach involves both transnational and local (regional) 
studies. 2002 saw the publication of such works as Transnationale Erinne-
rungsorte: Nord- und südeuropäische Perspektiven, Transnationale Ge-
dächtnisorte in Zentraleuropa [37; 38], etc. Similar studies are dedicated to 
local sites of memory (at the level of cities and regions). The first attempts 
to apply this method theorizing the history of Königsberg and East Prussia 
were made by the Polish and German historians R. Traba, B. Hoppe, 
A. Engel-Braunschmidt, and others [15; 22; 23; 36]. Lithuanian researchers 
offer an analysis of ‘Lithuania Minor’, a Lithuanian site of memory [41]. 
Finally, Russian scholars are using the notion of sites of memory to recon-
struct major elements of regional identity discourse and practices of collec-
tive memory and historical consciousness in Soviet Kaliningrad (1945—
1990) [5]. 
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In the cases above, the ‘sites of memory’ have come a long way from 
their initial perceived function of supporting national master narrative to-
wards detailed studies into specific collective memories, their competition, 
strategies for their representations, and so on. Today, studying the ‘politics 
of memory’ at any level requires identifying and analysing ‘sites of 
memory’ both at the general national level and at the level of individual 
social and/or ethnic groups. In this context, the politics of memory will be 
described as the activities of different actors aimed at interpreting and rep-
resenting the past through the symbolically expressed ‘sites of memory’ (in 
the case of the ruling elite, the politics of memory is an instance of the pol-
itics of commemoration). 
Another important notion is the concept of ‘conflicts of memory’. In 
Eastern Europe, they usually focus on the interpretation of the Soviet experi-
ence. In effect, there are many more grounds for ‘memorial wars’. For in-
stance, in Lithuania, commemorating the anti-Soviet partisans as heroes goes 
against the counter-narrative perpetuated by the Jewish communities. Ac-
cording to the latter, some members of the Lithuanian resistance were Nazi 
collaborationists and accomplices to the Holocaust. A situation captured ex-
ceptionally well in one article analysing to the debates surrounding the 
Bronze Soldier in Tallinn: the author of the study, Claus Leggewie aptly 
named it ‘A divided history of Europe’ [27]. 
The concerns of ‘division’ become more and more pronounced when one 
looks at the politics if memory studied at the regional level (see, for exam-
ple, Krzysztof Pomian’s article ‘”Geteiltes Gedächtnis”: Europas Erin-
nerungsorte als politisches und kulturelles Phänomen’ [31, S. 39]). Alt-
hough the politics of memory in the Baltics Sea region is still a very new re-
search area, it is evident that one of its central questions is the historical po-
tential for conflicts in the region. In her article, Imbi Sooman stresses the 
conflict potential of relations between the Baltics and Russia alongside that 
of Swedish-Finnish and Finnish-Estonian debates [34, S. 17—25]. In Central 
and Eastern European history, collisions of memories of the deportation of 
German population from regions ceded to Poland, the USSR, and Czecho-
slovakia following World War II are fraught with imminent conflicts. In the 
cultural memory of Russians (except those from Kaliningrad), this aspect of 
the first post-war years is almost unnoticeable; therefore, deportation does 
not play an important role in the national politics of memory. However, in 
the cultural memory of Germans, the Polish, and Czechs it has an increasing 
significance (see [26]). 
Western researchers focus on the Western politics of memory, which is 
natural. A more recent trend, however, is an increase in the interest to the 
history of Eastern Europe. Newer publications include monographs examin-
ing individual cases, F. B. Schenk’s fundamental work Alexander Nevsky in 
Russian cultural memory 1263—2000) [12], and such collections of papers 
as The politics of memory and the culture of remembrance in new Russia 
(2009, ed. by L. Karl and I. Poljanski [21; 25]). In the first case, a classical 
interpretation of the evolution of Alexander Nevsky’s image in Russian cul-
tural memory transformed into a study of mechanisms of the politics of 
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memory in the Russian state until the post-Soviet period. The second work 
opens a discussion of the ways in which the politics of memory and the cul-
ture of remembrance correlated in Russia at the turn of the century. 
One study worth noting is the article by Olga Kurilo, published in a col-
lection of papers. The article follows the evolution of Russian cultural 
memory in the USSR and the post-perestroika Russia. Until the perestroika, 
Russian memory landscape (Erinnerungslandschaft) was mostly homoge-
nous. The official discourse of the past in a multi-national state prescribed a 
single Soviet history rather than a diversity of national histories. The offi-
cially approved memories of individual national groups were subject to sig-
nificant ideological distortion. The central themes of Soviet history (primari-
ly, the October revolution and World War II) dominated both research and 
public rituals. Homogenisation of the culture of memories was made possi-
ble through imposing prohibitions on alternative memories and public criti-
cism. Tabooed topics (the Red Terror, deportation of peoples under Stalin’s 
rule, captivity and collaborationism during World War II) were forced out 
into the space of personal and family memories or the memory of groups be-
yond the governmental control (dissidents). Individual memories of war con-
tradicting the canonical version could not be made public [25, S. 144—145]. 
The perestroika created conditions for publishing alternative memories 
of the past. The post-Soviet memory is manifested primarily within special 
‘sites of memory’ and ‘figures of remembrance (Gedächtnisfiguren). The 
latter include the two competing discourses of the past chosen for analy-
sis — the democratic and national-patriotic discourses [25, S. 146]. The first 
rests on acknowledging pluralism and possibility of alternative ways of so-
cial development it is supported by human rights organisations. The victim 
discourse (Opferdiskurs) observed in the Soviet cultural memory in the form 
of the narrative about the suffering of Soviet civilians during the placed the 
victims of the Soviet regime in the centre of memories. Despite certain 
achievements in promoting the democratic culture of remembrance both in 
the capital and regions (efforts of the ‘Memorial’ society, erection of monu-
ments to victims of political repression, introduction of the topic of Holo-
caust into the school curricula, etc.), the post-Soviet memory contains topics 
that are still difficult to discuss (for instance, the scale of collaborationism 
during the war) [25, S. 147]. However, Russian authorities (the article was 
published in 2009) supported, to a degree, the democratic memory informing 
the society of its openness to and readiness for a dialogue with the West. 
The ‘national-patriotic memory’, the domain of quite a few national-pat-
riotic organisations (most notably, the Russian Orthodox Church), promotes 
the commemoration of events central to the formation of national identity. 
This figure of remembrance, according to O. Kurilo, is not supported by the 
Russian intellectual elite, whereas many such organisations are found on the 
margins of the society  [25, S. 154]. 
Any historian would conclude that the modern culture of remembrance 
in Russia eludes an unambiguous definition by bringing together different 
symbols and ‘sites of memory’. The heterogeneity of the priorities of mod-
ern Russian politics of memory also relates to the privatisation and interna-
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tionalisation of memories, selective revival of old stereotypes, etc. Accord-
ing to Kurilo, the process of democratisation of the culture of remembrance 
in Russia is slow for both political and socio-psychological reasons: the liq-
uidation of Soviet institutions did not change the mentality of the Soviet 
people [25, S. 158]. 
O. Kurilo meticulously paints a detailed picture of the evolution of the 
culture of remembrance in Russia, yet a number of points in her study can 
still be questioned. The characteristics of the culture of remembrances, 
whose framework was outlined by the Soviet politics of memory, are justi-
fied, although the homogeneity of said culture is slightly exaggerated. Cer-
tain discussions were allowed in the framework of Soviet historiography — 
at different stages, assessments of the repressions and Stalin’s regime ranged 
from condemnation to silencing. Versions of national history deviating from 
the strictly ideologised canon existed in the Soviet republics (the victim dis-
course described the suffering of the people caused by both its own ruling 
class and Russian imperialism). Lev Gudkov analyses the heterogeneity of 
Soviet politics of memory by bringing the case of remembering the Great 
Patriotic War, ranging from a split between the personal experience of veter-
ans and the official ceremonial version of the events in the late 1940s-early 
1950s to intensive moulding of popular ideas of the war in the 1960s-early 
1980s [3, p. 90—91; compare with 6, p. 90—105; 21]. 
Defining the post-Soviet situation as a competition between two ‘figures 
of remembrance’ is incomplete (preservation of the Soviet toponyms and 
symbols suggests that there is another discourse). Both ‘figures of remem-
brance’ hold certain positions in public opinion and preferences of the elite: 
Olga Kurilo’s thesis about the authorities’ motives for supporting ‘democrat-
ic memory’ are relevant even in the context of Russia’s recent politics of 
memory, which has entailed a significant decrease in public support for 
‘democratic memory’. 
A proof is the decree of Russian government of August 15, 2015 On Es-
tablishing a Concept for Public Policy on Perpetuating the Memory of Vic-
tims of Political Repressions, adopted at the height of tensions with the 
West. The concept intricately combines democratic rhetoric and statist stere-
otypes: ‘Russia cannot become a rule-of-law state and play a leading role in 
the global community without perpetuating the memory of many millions of 
compatriots who fell victim to political repressions’ [9]. This concept can be 
considered a result of a compromise between different figures of remem-
brance, since it unites an apology of a state reclaiming its position in the 
‘global community’ with revering both ‘national-patriotic’ (‘persecution of 
religious confessions’ is mentioned as the second greatest tragedy of the So-
viet period after the ‘tremendous losses’ in the war years) and ‘democratic 
memory’ (the ‘formation of a rule-of-law states based on observation of hu-
man rights and the rights of social and ethnic groups’ is declared the first ob-
jective of building the national identity). The principle of ‘necessity of an 
objective analysis of both achievement of the Soviet period, and its tragic 
pages, including mass political repressions’ [9] creates complications famil-
iar to other elites (see the case of France described above). 
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Olga Kurilo’s views correspond to the findings of other historians of 
memory. An article by Jörg Ganzenmüller and Raphael Utz (editors of a col-
lection of paper entitled Sowjetische Verbrechen und Russische Erinnerung, 
2014) underlines the contradictory nature of Russia’s official policy towards 
Stalinism and the associated memory landscape [18, S. 28—30]. Similar 
conclusions can be found in the works of some Russian scholars [6; 7]. 
Studying the politics of memory on the territory of former East Prussia 
(the Warmian-Masurian voivodeship in Poland, the Kaliningrad region in 
Russia, and the Klaipeda Country in Lithuania) requires a common frame-
work for comparison provided by an analysis of the experiences of Socialism 
and post-socialist transition. The findings of Olga Kurilo and other authors 
can be extrapolated, with certain reservations, to all three regions, serving as 
a starting point for research on different models of the politics of memory on 
the territory of former East Prussia. 
For instance, the politics of memory in the Kaliningrad region (as well 
as other regions) reflects national trends and shows certain regional fea-
tures (in particular, those accounted for by the territory’s pre-war past). 
The Polish sociologist A. Sakson analyses differences in the symbolical 
appropriation of the lands of former East Prussia in Poland and the Lithua-
nian SSR (as dominated by the idea of reclaiming historical territories) and 
in the Russian Kaliningrad region, where the territory had to be ‘cultivated’ 
anew [32]. This way, two models of the politics of memory emerged. (It is 
worth stressing that, in the first post-war years, Stalin’s propaganda at-
tempted at using the model of ‘reclaiming native lands’. However, these 
attempts failed.) 
Developing to image of ‘division’, the Lithuanian historian Vasilijus 
Safronovas, famous for his works on Klaipeda’s ‘culture of remembrance’, 
came up with another comprehensive characteristic — the ‘unfinished divi-
sion of East Prussia’s legacy’. Although the German province has not ex-
isted as a single region for many decades, it still provokes conflicts of terri-
torial imagination based on the ethnographic principle and mental geogra-
phy resting on the idea of legitimacy of conquests’ [10, p. 208]. The schol-
ar emphasises that Polish and German historians are experiencing a rap-
prochement of cultures describing East Prussian past from two different 
national perspectives. So far, this method remains unattainable in the case 
of Russian and Lithuanian historians, since the ‘parties rely on two dramat-
ically different approaches — one based on the idea of legitimate conquest 
and the other on the concept of ethnographic unity of population’ [ibid.], 
which results in the inevitable collision of memories, partly accounted for 
by the ‘unfinished division’ of legacy. 
In the post-Soviet period, the contradictions in the politics of memory in 
the Westernmost Russian region were more pronounced than in the other re-
gions. Olga Kurilo says that Kaliningrad retains such attributes of the Soviet 
era as the name of the city and the monument to Mikhail Kalinin [25, 
S. 154]. Lithuania and Poland, despite the difference in the historical experi-
ence of these countries, chose a different strategy for de-Sovietisation. 
Moreover, a comparative approach can go beyond the three ‘East Prussian’ 
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lands and increase the scale through productive juxtaposition of the politics 
of memory in former German regions ceded to Poland in part (East Prussian) 
and in full (Silesia) [13, p. 28—29] or through comparing differences and 
similarities in the historical justification of Stalin’s strategy for Sovietisation 
of newly incorporated district of the Kaliningrad region, part of the Karelian 
Isthmus, and Sakhalin with the Kuril Islands [30]. 
For modern scholars, studying the politics of memory is closely connect-
ed with using an interdisciplinary approach through collaborating with spe-
cialists in cultural studies, urban studies, trauma studies, discourse analysis, 
etc. The recent years have seen increasing interest in the socio-psychological 
aspect of the ‘culture of remembrance’ — the tension between memory and 
identity and the cognitive dimensions of changes in the culture of remem-
brance (for a detailed review, see [17]). In this light, Olga Kurilo’s state-
ments about the ‘mentality of the Soviet person’ can be augmented in view 
of these new theoretical findings. 
As any other concept, the ‘politics of memory’ and ‘memorial politics’ 
have a history of their own. They emerged quite recently and can well lose 
their relevance. Krzysztof Pomian, understanding collective memory as a 
source of inevitable conflicts, made a radical statement: ‘Recently, much has 
been said about the ‘politics of memory’. I suggest replacing it with the ‘eth-
nics of memory’. [31, S. 40]. With time, the humanistic pathos of scholars 
will probably prevail over the interests of political elites. At the moment, 
however, we cannot abandon studies of the politics of memory. 
Changes in topics are accounted for by studying the continuity between 
the earlier and later periods in the development of the politics of memory 
pursued by modern states. This includes identifying contradictions in the in-
terpretations and representations of the past by different ethnic groups (in-
cluding minorities), analysing discursive and visual mechanisms of the poli-
tics of memory, etc. ‘Sites of memory’, ‘politics of memory’, and ‘politics of 
commemoration’ are becoming different points of entry to the field formu-
lating and answering the questions relating to memory and identity. The 
need to use these concepts — despite the instability of the conceptual 
framework and the existing methodological limitations — was proven 
through analysing master narratives of national level. Apparently, it will also 
be the case in studying histories of regions, including the territory of former 
East Prussia, a land now divided between three states. 
 
This article was supported by the Russian Foundation of the Humanities 
within research project 15-21-06002a(m) ‘The politics of memory in the 
Russian-Polish-Lithuanian space on the territory of former East Prussia: 
Continuity and changes in the cultural landscape (1945—2015)’. 
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